Morality and Psychopathic Criminals. Ethicocentrism, Mental Incapacity, Free Will, and the Fear of Decriminalization

Present-day legal judgments of psychopathic criminals strongly avoid the exploitation of “moral” considerations. Currently, the attribution of responsibility to criminals often takes advantage of the cognitive concept of mental incapacity so that, in these cases, the moral judgment about moral conducts of “psycho-pathological” criminals is potentially extinguished. I contend that the theories and methods that are currently used in western societies to discharge moral and legal responsibility are not clear in their epistemic structure and so partially unreliable. To support this conclusion I take advantage of my recent cognitive studies concerning the multiplicity of moral frameworks, the gene/cognitive niche co-evolution, and the concept of free will

Ritual artifacts as memory stores of cognitive habits

Ritual artifacts are produced by individuals and/or small groups, left over-there, in the environment, perceivable, sharable, and more or less available. Artifacts of this type can be considered cognitive mediators, insofar as they are collective memory stores of related habits, in the sense that they mediate and make available the story of their origin and the actions related to it, which can be learnt and/or re-activated when needed. Indeed, symbolic habits embedded in rites can also be seen as memory mediators which maximize abducibility, which is the human capacity to guess hypotheses, because they maximize recoverability of already stored cognitive contents. In sum, once suitable representations are externalized in a ritual artifact, they can be sensorially picked up and manipulated to re-internalize them when humans attend the rite: the externalization can be seen as the fruit of the so-called “disembodiment of the mind” as a significant cognitive perspective, able to show some basic features of what I called manipulative abduction, which I will describe in my presentation. When analyzing artifacts and habits in ritual settings, it is important to remember that interesting cases of creative meaning formation are also at play. Actually, we can distinguish two kinds of habits that are at play in rites: (a) a knowledge-based kind of habit, for the analysis of which the concept of “affordance” is useful, which also plays a pivotal role in the justification of the agent’s own beliefs; and (b) an ignorance-based kind of habit, which will be proved as necessary for the beginning of thought, and which is at the base of the ampliative abductive reasoning

Is abduction ignorance-preserving? Conventions, models and fictions in science

Abduction is a procedure in which something that lacks classical explanatory epistemic virtue can be accepted because it has virtue of another kind: Gabbay and Woods (2005, The Reach of Abduction) contend (GW-model) that abduction presents an ignorance-preserving or (ignorance-mitigating) character. From this perspective abductive reasoning is a response to an ignorance-problem; through abduction the basic ignorance—that does not have to be considered a total ‘ignorance’—is neither solved nor left intact. Abductive reasoning is an ignorance-preserving accommodation of the problem at hand. Is abduction really ignorance-preserving? To better answer this question I will take advantage of my eco-cognitive model (EC-model) of abduction and of three examples taken from the areas of both philosophy and epistemology. It will be illustrated that through abduction, knowledge can be enhanced, even when abduction is not considered an inference to the best explanation (IBE) in the classical sense of the expression, i.e. an inference necessarily characterized by an empirical evaluation phase, or an inductive phase, as Peirce called it. (1) Peirce provides various justifications of the knowledge enhancing role of abduction, even when abduction is not considered an IBE in the classical sense of the expression, i.e. an inference necessarily characterized by an empirical evaluation phase, or inductive phase. These justifications basically resort to the conceptual exploitation of evolutionary and metaphysical ideas, which clearly show that abduction is constitutively akin to truth, even if certainly always ignorance-preserving or mitigating in the sense that the ‘absolute truth’ is never reached through abduction; (2) in empirical science abducing conventions favours and increases knowledge even if these hypotheses remain evidentially inert—at least in the sense that it is not possible to empirically falsify them. Consequently abduced conventions are evidentially inert but knowledge enhancing at the rational level of science; (3) in science we do not have to confuse the process of abducing models with the process of abducing fictions: the recent epistemological conundrum concerning fictionalism presents to us the epistemic situation in which the models abduced by scientists reveal themselves not to be ‘airy nothings’ at all, and certainly different in their gnoseological status from literary fictions. Scientific models instead play fundamental ‘rational’ knowledge enhancing roles: in a static perspective (e.g. when inserted in a textbook) scientific models can appear fictional to the epistemologist, but their fictional character disappears if a dynamic perspective is adopted. Abduction in scientific model-based reasoning is not a suspicious process of guessing fictions

Docility and “through doing” morality: An alternative approach to ethics

In this paper, we aim at presenting the distributed morality approach as it can be described by the docility model of social interactions. The proposition “morality is a matter of social interaction” constitutes our starting point. We aim at pointing out the ways through which individuals create moral alternatives to a given situation. The paper is dedicated to presenting morality as something connected to human cognition. We introduce a “manipulative” way of thinking about morality, and we argue that it is “distributed” through things, animals, computers, and other human beings (section I); furthermore, the idea of a type of “through doing” morality comes up. Then, we find that this model supports an alternative view of the socio-economic system and, therefore, we suggest that the docility model (section II, as amended from Simon’s original model 1990; 1993), fits the case. The field of business ethics exempts useful insights from research on this issue. Recent studies on moral thinking and moral imagination seem to support this research project.cognition, distributed morality, docility, social interactions, socioeconomic system

A philosophical “stance”

When commenting on a paper of mine, “Political Correctness between Wise Stoicism and Violent Hypocrisy”, published in 2016 in the journal Philosophies (Magnani [2016]), the logician and philosopher John Woods has introduced the neologism “stancing”, he derived from the subtitle of my book of 2011 Understanding Violence. The Intertwining of Morality, Religion and Violence: A Philosophical Stance. Woods was referring to a specific practice of philosophy that characterizes my philosophical research: I especially like this neologism. To the aim of depicting my thoughts regarding the practice of philosophy I prefer, some biographical remarks have to be submitted to the attention of the reader, that will be of help in delineating the general idea of philosophizing as “stancing”

Social practices and embubblement

The present contribution describes the nature of social practices based on habitual behavior. The first part concerns the notion of “habit” from a perspective that crosses philosophy and science. Habits structure our daily life and possess also a social nature showed by informally shared habits and institutionalized rituals. After a brief reference to the philosophical debate, we point out the fundamental dimensions of habitual behavior i.e. routine and goal-directed behavior. They characterize also shared social habits like rituals because we need (a) to simply follow social institutional practices and (b) actively cooperate to reach a certain goal. Our descriptive strategy aims at promoting the aspect of “control” in habitual behavior namely the possibility of accepting or refusing to do something. This control does not work in many pathological cases and cases of auto-illusion. The second part of the article will illustrate the interesting but disregarded case of the epistemic and moral embubblement, explaining it as an individual cognitive process and as a specific social practice that once followed or institutionalized becomes a shared practice routinely performed. The main features of an epistemic bubble concern the widespread situation in which the cognitive agents always resolve the tension between their thinking that they know P and their knowing P in favor of knowing that P”. The related case of the moral bubble indicates the situation in which agents are potentially or actually violent and unaware of it. This cognitive process expresses how difficulties in recognizing one’s own violence lead to disregard the possible or actual inflicted harm: in this case a process of what can be called “autoimmunity” is at play. We will contend that the concept of moral bubble can provide an integrated and unified perspective able to interpret in a novel way many social practices in which morality and violence are intertwined

La moralidad distribuida y la tecnología. Cómo las cosas nos hacen morales,

In this paper, I contend that through technology people can simplify and solve moral tasks when they are in the presence of incomplete information and possess a diminished capacity to act morally. Many external things, usually inert from the moral point of view, can be transformed into what we will call moral mediators. Hence, not all of the moral tools are inside the head, many of them are shared and distributed in «external » objects and structures which function as ethical devices. Aiming at illustrating the intrigue of this ethical struggle between human beings and things, we will discuss the role of objects, structures, and technological artifacts by presenting them as moral carriers and mediators.En el presente artículo se sostiene que, a través de la tecnología, las personas podemos simplificar y resolver tareas morales incluso en presencia de información incompleta o de una capacidad insuficiente para la acción moral. Muchas cosas externas, normalmente concebidas como inertes desde un punto de vista moral, pueden considerarse lo que aquí se denominarán mediadores morales. Por lo tanto, no todas las herramientas morales están en el interior de nuestra cabeza, sino que muchas están distribuidas en objetos y estructuras externas que funcionan como dispositivos éticos. Con el objeto de investigar con detalle este conflicto ético entre los seres humanos y las cosas, consideraremos el papel que desempeñan los objetos, las estructuras y los artefactos tecnológicos mostrándolos como delegados y mediadores morales

La moralidad distribuida y la tecnología. Cómo las cosas nos hacen morales,

In this paper, I contend that through technology people can simplify and solve moral tasks when they are in the presence of incomplete information and possess a diminished capacity to act morally. Many external things, usually inert from the moral point of view, can be transformed into what we will call moral mediators. Hence, not all of the moral tools are inside the head, many of them are shared and distributed in «external » objects and structures which function as ethical devices. Aiming at illustrating the intrigue of this ethical struggle between human beings and things, we will discuss the role of objects, structures, and technological artifacts by presenting them as moral carriers and mediators.En el presente artículo se sostiene que, a través de la tecnología, las personas podemos simplificar y resolver tareas morales incluso en presencia de información incompleta o de una capacidad insuficiente para la acción moral. Muchas cosas externas, normalmente concebidas como inertes desde un punto de vista moral, pueden considerarse lo que aquí se denominarán mediadores morales. Por lo tanto, no todas las herramientas morales están en el interior de nuestra cabeza, sino que muchas están distribuidas en objetos y estructuras externas que funcionan como dispositivos éticos. Con el objeto de investigar con detalle este conflicto ético entre los seres humanos y las cosas, consideraremos el papel que desempeñan los objetos, las estructuras y los artefactos tecnológicos mostrándolos como delegados y mediadores morales